The design of hybrid individual incentive mechanisms for bycatch reduction

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After Chinook salmon bycatch reaching record levels in 2006 and 2007 in the Bering Sea pollock fishery, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) began consideration of a Chinook bycatch catch limit or hard cap that would close the fishery if it were reached. Because bycatch and salmon abundance are only partially correlated, the optimal method to reduce bycatch will both prevent an excessive level of bycatch and protect salmon at periods of lower bycatch encounters that are present at times when stocks are weak and protection is most important. After NMFS determined that it was legally unable to impose fees for the secondary purpose of protecting salmon at low abundances, the Council presented industry with a choice: a fixed hard cap of 47,591 salmon per year or a hard-cap of 68,392 salmon with an industry-operated individualincentive program that would provides incentives for salmon reduction at all salmon and pollock conditions. Here we feature characteristics of programs that will protect salmon during high and low encounter periods and the specifics of programs proposed by industry. We discuss the efficiency and effectiveness of these programs and discuss the importance of having individual bycatch quota under a hard cap which could otherwise erode benefits in the rationalized fishery. The Council passed a plan amendment that will go in place in 2011 that will allow for the implementation of a hybrid incentive system, potentially efficiently protecting salmon at all abundance levels